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Abstract—With the development of wireless communication
technologies which considerably contributed to the development
of wireless sensor networks (WSN), we have witnessed an ever-
increasing WSN based applications which induced a host of
research activities in both academia and industry. Since most
of the target WSN applications are very sensitive, security issue
is one of the major challenges in the deployment of WSN.
One of the important building blocks in securing WSN is key
management. Traditional key management solutions developed
for other networks are not suitable for WSN since WSN networks
are resource (e.g. memory, computation, energy) limited. Key
pre-distribution algorithms have recently evolved as efficient
alternatives of key management in these networks. In the key pre-
distribution systems, secure communication is achieved between
a pair of nodes either by the existence of a key allowing for
direct communication or by a chain of keys forming a key-path
between the pair.
In this paper, we propose methods which bring prior knowl-
edge of network characteristics and application constraints into
the design of key pre-distribution schemes, in order to provide
better security and connectivity while requiring less resources.
Our methods are based on casting the prior information as a
graph. Motivated by this idea, we also propose a class of quasi-
symmetric designs referred here to as g-designs. These produce
key pre-distribution schemes that significantly improve upon the
existing constructions based on unital designs. We give some
examples, and point out open problems for future research.
Index Terms—Balanced incomplete block design, quasi-
symmetric design, key pre-distribution, sensor networks, graphs.
I. INTRODUCTION
W IRELESS sensor networks (WSN) typically consist ofa large number of sensor nodes with limited memory
and power. These networks are used in both military and
civilian applications. In military applications, sensor nodes
may be deployed for example in battlefield surveillance, while
in environmental applications, distributed sensors could moni-
tor physical or environmental conditions such as temperature,
sound, pressure, etc. and cooperatively pass their data through
the network to a main location [1], [2]. Because of the
sensitivity of most WSN applications, security issue is one
of the major challenges in the deployment of WSN.
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Security is an essential question for many sensor network
applications, especially for military applications. Providing
security to small sensor nodes is challenging because of the
resources limitations of sensor nodes in terms of storage,
computations, communications, and energy. One of the impor-
tant building blocks for the development of security solutions
in WSN is key management. The key management scheme
design is more complicated due to the characteristics of the
WSN such as: (1) The vulnerability of nodes to physical
attack, where the deployment in a hostile area makes the
attacker capable to simply compromise any node and to reveal
its security materials (e.g. keys, functions, ...); (2) The nature
of wireless communication, where the radio links are insecure
and an attacker can eavesdrop on the radio transmissions,
inject bits in the channel, and replay previously overheard
packets; (3) The density and the large size of the network
which make the control of all nodes very hard.
For security or privacy reasons, it is often critical to build
encrypted communications between two sensor nodes using
a common secret key. Key pre-distribution scheme (KPS) is
a classical way to set up secret keys among sensor nodes
before the deployment phase. Compared with online key
exchange protocols, key pre-distribution is more attractive for
networks consisting of large number of nodes with limited
communication/computation resources [3].
Over the last decade, a host of research on key pre-
distribution issue for WSN have been conducted and many
solutions have been proposed in literature. Existing KPS fall
into two categories: probabilistic and deterministic schemes. In
probabilistic schemes, a direct connection between each two
nodes is established with certain probability, i.e. probability
that these two nodes share a common key. In deterministic
schemes, however, each pair of nodes are known to be directly
connected or not.
Eschenauer and Gligor [3] proposed a random key pre-
distribution (RKP) scheme. Later on, there have been some
improvements on RKP, e.g. improvements on its resilience by
increasing the “intersection threshold” (the least number of
common keys for two nodes to establish a direct connection)
[4], or improvements on its resilience as well as higher
probability of sharing keys by using deployment knowledge
[5]–[9]. Schemes called “multiple key spaces” are proposed
that combine different KPS to achieve better performance
[10]–[12].
A simple deterministic scheme assigns a distinct key to
each link, and b − 1 pairwise keys to each node, where b is
the number of nodes. Choi et al. [13] proposed an improved
method where each node only needs to store (b+ 1)/2 keys.
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2However, these methods may not be easily scalable. Camtepe
et al. [14], [15] proposed a novel method that uses block
designs for key pre-distribution. They proposed a deterministic
key pre-distribution scheme that maps a symmetric balanced
incomplete block design (SBIBD) or generalized quadrangles
(GQ) to key pre-distribution.
There are some other works that use design theory to
construct effective KPS. Lee et al. [16] introduced the common
intersection designs to KPS. Chakrabarti et al. [17] used
transversal designs and merging block techniques. Ruj et al.
[18] proposed a KPS that is based on partially balanced
incomplete block designs (PBIBD). They also used triple
system to design a probabilistic KPS [19]. Later on, Bose et al.
[20] proposed an improved construction that combines several
PBIBDs. Bechkit et al. [21] proposed the unital-based key
pre-distribution scheme (UKP), a deterministic scheme that
improves the scalability of a network. More detailed surveys
could be found in [22]–[24].
A. Motivations for Graph-Based KPS
Usually, the main goal of KPS is to seek a design solution
that provides more connectivity coverage while requiring less
memory (or using as few keys as possible). Existing designs
are often evaluated under criteria such as network connectivity,
average path length, network resiliency, storage overhead, and
network scalability.
Our contributions are motivated by the following observa-
tions:
• Observation 1: In many applications, there are several
intended deployment locations, and typically a number
of sensor nodes are deployed in each of these locations.
In hierarchical scenarios, each group of sensors placed
in a location must pass their data to sensor nodes of
higher ranks. This means that for a hierarchical sensor
network, nodes in the same group need more connectivity
than those across groups (Figure 1a). This can be used
to reduce the number of required keys.
• Observation 2: In some scenarios, a group of sensor
nodes are naturally set in a master-slave architecture.
For instance, the commander of a military needs more
communications with his lower rank staff. This means
that one or some nodes are in charge of collecting
data/sending command signals to the remaining nodes
(Figure 1b). So there are some important connections that
we need to establish with higher efficiency and security.
• Observation 3: Two sensor nodes can communicate with
each other only in a certain distance referred to as the
radio frequency (RF) range (Figure 1c). If it is known that
certain pairs never connect directly due to being outside
of each other’s radio frequency range, then it would be a
waste of resources to assign common keys to them.
• Observation 4: If it is known in advance that certain
connections are more likely to be eavesdropped, the cor-
responding nodes should not share common keys (Figure
1d).
These observations motivate the use of prior information in
designing improved KPS schemes.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Fig. 1: Observations
B. Contribution and Organization of This Work
We propose graph-based key pre-distributions (block de-
signs) that incorporate prior knowledge of network charac-
teristics and constraints. This provides better security and
connectivity while requiring less resources once properly used.
We elaborate on two practical scenarios, and explain why
the graph-based design is preferable or even required. Some
previous work that used deployment knowledge to optimize
KPS may look similar, but is different in concept. For example,
the scope of “deployment” was usually in a geographic sense.
However, the model that communication should not pass
through some links of potential danger was rarely studied, up
to our knowledge. A general framework that casts the prior
information as graphs is the main motivation of this work.
We first briefly review the basics of block design theory in
Section II. Especially, we propose g-designs, a class of quasi-
3symmetric designs, and initiate the study of the applications of
them to KPS. We propose the concept of graph-based KPS in
Section III. In Section IV, we demonstrate the improvements
provided by graph-based KPS and g-designs in a specific
scenario. In Section V we study another scenario. We further
provide an algorithmic framework (referred to MAR) for KPS
design for the second scenario in Section VI. Finally, we make
our conclusions in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Block Design Theory
Block design theory deals with the properties, existence,
and construction of systems of finite sets whose intersections
have specified numerical properties. A block design (BD) is
a set system (V,B). Each element in V is called a point (or
treatment), and each element in B is called a block.
Definition 1. A Balanced Incomplete Block Design (BIBD)
with parameters λ, k, r, v, and b is a block design in which
v points are arranged in b blocks, such that each block
contains k points, each point appears in r blocks, and each
pair of points appear in exactly λ blocks. It is denoted by
(λ, k, r, v, b)-BIBD. It may also be denoted by (λ, k, v)-BIBD,
as r and b are given by [25]
r =
λ(v − 1)
k − 1 , b =
λ(v − 1)v
(k − 1)k . (1)
Definition 2. A BIBD is a g-design if any two blocks intersect
in either zero or a fixed number of points g > 0.
A quasi-symmetric design is a BIBD with two possible
intersection numbers for any pair of blocks. A g-design clearly
belongs to the class of quasi-symmetric designs when one
intersection number equals to zero. But the term g-design is
defined here for convenience. Some properties and construc-
tions of g-designs have been studied in [26]–[30].
Clearly, any (λ, k, r, v, b)-BIBD with λ = 1 (also referred
to as a Steiner system) is a g-design with g = 1.
Also, any unital design is a (1,m+1,m2,m3+1,m2(m2−
m+ 1))-BIBD for some m, and is also a g-design.
Definition 3. Let G be a graph. Let V (G) and E(G) be
respectively the set of nodes and edges of G. G is regular with
degree d if every node of G has incidence degree d. A clique
in G is a subset of its vertices such that every two vertices in
the subset are connected by an edge; in other words, it is a
subgraph of G and is complete.
Definition 4. A strongly regular graph (SRG) with parameter
set (b, d, t, u) is defined as a regular graph of size b and
degree d, such that every two adjacent nodes have t common
neighbors, and every two non-adjacent nodes have u common
neighbors. The SRG is denoted by srg(b, d, t, u).
B. Some Properties of g-Designs
The following results are helpful for the future analysis.
Theorem 1. If there exists a (λ, k, v)−BIBD which is also
a g-design with g = 2, then there exists a regular graph G
of size b such that its edge set E(G) is a disjoint union of
v(v − 1)/2 subsets, where each subset forms a clique of size
λ. Also, b satisfies the equation
k(k − 1) = λv(v − 1)
b
. (2)
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix A, as it uses a definition
to be introduced in Section III.
Theorem 1 provides a necessary condition for the g = 2
case. The following result shows the equivalence between g-
designs with g = 1 and a class of graphs.
Theorem 2. The existence of a (λ = 1, k, v)-BIBD is equiva-
lent to the existence of a regular graph G of size b such that its
edge set E(G) is a disjoint union of v subsets each of which
forms a clique of size r, where
rv
b
=
v − 1
r
+ 1 ∈ N, (3)
N is the set of natural numbers.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix B, as it uses a technique
to be introduced in Section VI.
Lemma 1. ( [31], Lemma 2.1)
If a (λ, k, v)-BIBD is a g-design, then its design graph is a
strongly regular graph, denoted by srg(b, d, t, u), When λ = 1,
we have
d =
v − k
k − 1k, t =
v − 1
k − 1 − 2 + (k − 1)
2, u = k2. (4)
III. GRAPH-BASED KPS AND EVALUATION METRICS
Block designs are intimately related to key pre-distribution
schemes. In a KPS system, each sensor node is assigned a set
of keys, called “key ring”. Let a key correspond to a point,
and a key ring correspond to a block. For example, A unital
design-based KPS gives m2(m2 − m + 1) key rings from a
key pool of m3 + 1 keys, such that each key ring contains
m+ 1 keys.
In sensor network applications, if two key rings share at
least one common key, the corresponding two nodes can be
directly connected to each other. The direct connections form
a graph, whose nodes correspond to the sensor nodes, and
edges correspond to direct connections. This graph is referred
to as the “design graph”. In mathematical terms:
Definition 5. A design graph for a specific block design is a
graph GD whose nodes V (GD) correspond to the blocks. Two
nodes are connected in GD if and only if the corresponding
two blocks share at least one point.
The prior structural information of a network (discussed)
may also be modeled as a graph:
Definition 6. A target graph for a specific WSN is a triplet
of graphs GT = (GcT , G
u
T , G
r
T ) that satisfies
1) each node of GcT , G
u
T , or G
r
T corresponds to a node in
the WSN,
2) two nodes are connected in GcT if and only if the corre-
sponding nodes in the WSN must directly communicate,
43) two nodes are connected in GuT if and only if the
corresponding nodes in the WSN are required not to
directly communicate, and
4) for any pair of nodes not covered by the above two
cases, they are not connected in GrT if and only if the
corresponding nodes in the WSN may communicate via
a path but not necessarily communicate directly.
We note that design graphs and target graphs are undirected
and unweighted. Also in the classical case, GcT , G
u
T are null
graphs (denoted by ∅) and GrT is a complete graph, i.e. GT =
(∅, ∅, Gcomplete) where Gcomplete denotes the complete graph.
For a given WSN, assume that we are given a target
graph GT that reflects the available prior information. A
natural question is how to incorporate GT into the classical
evaluation metrics, in order to address practical concerns (e.g.
Observations 1-4).
First, we briefly review the classical performance metrics in
terms of a design graph GD.
• Direct connectivity coverage is the fraction of direct
links to all possible links in the network, i.e. the proba-
bility that a given pair of nodes can directly connect.
• Average path length is the expectation of the length
of the shortest path between two nodes drawn uniformly
from the network. It can be calculated as the average
length of the shortest paths between pairs of nodes in
GD. It is defined to be infinite (∞) if there exist two
nodes that cannot establish a connection path.
• Network resiliency NRx measures the fraction of un-
compromised external links when x sensor nodes are
captured. It can be calculated as the fraction of edges
that do not contain keys employed in the compromised
nodes.
• Storage overhead measures the memory required to store
the keys in each node, often calculated as the size of each
block.
• Network scalability is the total number of keys needed,
for a given number of nodes.
Consider a target graph GT . Some of the above criteria need
to be modified accordingly.
• Direct connectivity coverage (DCC) and average path
length (APL)
If two nodes do not communicate (or are not connected
in GcT ∪ GrT ), whether they share keys should not be
considered into the evaluation of a KPS (Observation 1
and Observation 3). We therefore restrict the calculations
of the two metrics to the edge set E(GD)∩E(GcT ∪GrT ),
e.g. only consider the edges in GD that also appear in
GcT ∪GrT .
• Direct important connectivity coverage (DICC)
Direct important connectivity coverage can be calculated
as the direct connectivity coverage restricted to GcT , i.e.
|E(GcT ) ∩ E(GD)|/|E(GcT )| with | · | representing the
cardinality of a set. This metric is meaningful only when
GcT is not empty.
• Network resiliency (NR)
Observation 4 provides a scenario where certain nodes
are required not to communicate. This is represented by
the edges of GuT . Reflected in the metric of network
resiliency, if two compromised nodes are connected in
both GD and GuT , the common keys they share are
regarded as captured. Thus, NRx can be calculated as
the fraction of of edges that do not contain keys that
are employed by edges in E(GD) ∩ E(GuT ) or the x
compromised nodes. It reduces to the classical case when
GuT is a null graph.
Definition 7. A KPS is graph-based, if it is designed based
on the target graph. Its performance is evaluated based on the
metrics above.
Since it is not easy to provide a universal design that is
suitable for any situation, we focus on the following two
different cases of graph-based KPS.
Scenario 1. Consider the case when GT = (∅, ∅, GrT ), i.e.
every two nodes may or may not communicate. Notice that
in this scenario, we need the modified definition of “direct
connectivity coverage” and “average path length”.
Scenario 2. Consider the case when GT = (GcT , GuT , ∅), i.e.
GcT ∪ GuT is a complete graph, and two nodes either must
communicate or are required not to communicate. Notice that
in this scenario, we need the modified definition of “network
resiliency”, and the metric “direct important connectivity
coverage”.
IV. THE GT = (∅, ∅, GrT ) SCENARIO
In this scenario, GrT contains the information about pairs
of nodes that do not need direct connections. If GrT is non-
trivial, i.e. GrT is not a complete graph, we may improve the
performance by employing the extra information provided by
GrT .
For comparison, we first consider the trivial case in which
GrT is a complete graph.
(1) When GrT is a complete graph, Bechkit et al. [21]
propose a highly scalable KPS using unital design. This was
shown to outperform other KPS in many aspects. Here, we
examine a more general case. We use a (λ, k, r, v, b)-BIBD
with λ = 1 for KPS design, and evaluate the KPS parameters
as follows (in terms of v and k).
• Direct connectivity coverage / Direct important connec-
tivity coverage:
DCC =
bd/2
b(b− 1)/2 =
d
b− 1 =
v−k
k−1k
v(v−1)
k(k−1) − 1
=
(v − k)k2
v(v − 1)− k(k − 1) . (5)
• Average path length: If two nodes are not connected,
there are u > 1 nodes connecting both of them, so the
minimum path length between these two nodes is equal
to two. The average path length is thus
APL = DCC + 2(1−DCC) = 2−DCC. (6)
• Network resiliency: For approximate analysis, we assume
that the captured nodes are uniformly distributed among
5all the nodes. Since each key occurs in r blocks among
the total number of b blocks, the probability that a
key is not compromised when x nodes are captured is(
b−r
x
)
/
(
b
x
)
, where b = v(v−1)k(k−1) . Further, the probability
that a given link is compromised is
NRx =
(
b−r
x
)(
b
x
) . (7)
• Storage overhead: It is the size of each block, i.e. SO =
k.
• Network scalability: It is the total number of keys, i.e.
NS = v.
(2) When GrT is not a complete graph, in order to exploit
the graph information, let us consider a network in which
there are s groups and each of the group contains b0 sensor
nodes. For each group, there are τ0 (0 ≤ τ0 ≤ b0/s) “central
nodes” (or nodes of higher rank) who are responsible for
collecting information from all the other nodes in the same
group. Besides this, between any two groups only the central
nodes could establish connections; in other words, a “non-
central node” can only communicate with the nodes within the
same group. In terms of a target graph, GrT is isomorphic to
the following matrix [Jmn]sb0×sb0 (two graphs are isomorphic
if the vertices are the same up to a relabeling):
Jmn = 1, ∀0 ≤ (m mod b0), (n mod b0) < τ0; (8)
Jmn = 1, ∀
⌊
m
b0
⌋
=
⌊
n
b0
⌋
; (9)
Jmn = 0, otherwise. (10)
Here, bxc denotes the largest integer that is no more than the
real number x. Equations (8) and (9) represent the possible
connections among all the central nodes and among the nodes
in each group, respectively.
Our goal is to design a KPS such that any (central or
non-central) node could transfer its information to any other
node in the network, while satisfying the required performance
metrics. A possible graph-based KPS design is to assign keys,
e.g. via BIBD with λ = 1, for each of the g groups, together
with the group of all central nodes. We now evaluate the
network performance of this graph-based design, and compare
it with the classical way.
Let v0 and (s+1)v0 be respectively the size of the key pool
for each group of the graph-based KPS and for the classical
KPS. Let b = sb0, v = (s+ 1)v0. Then we compute:
• Direct connectivity coverage / Direct important connec-
tivity coverage:
For classical KPS, from b = v(v−1)k(k−1) we obtain k =
O(
√
v(v−1)
b ) = O(vb
− 12 ), 1 and from Equation (5) we
further obtain
DCC = O(
vk2
v2
) = O(vb−1) = O(v0b−10 ). (11)
1O(·) notation: f = O(g) means there exists a positive constant c such
that c−1g < f < cg.
For approximate analysis, we assume that the edges of
unital design are uniformly distributed in E(GrT ) and
E
′
(GrT ) (the complement of E(G
r
T )). This implies that
|E(GrT ) ∩ E(GD)|
|E(GrT )|
=
|E(GD)|(
b
2
) .
For graph-based KPS, the direct connectivity coverage
within one group is O(v0b−10 ), and within the central
nodes is O(v0(sτ0)−1) ≥ O(v0b−10 ) using the same
reasoning. So the overall DCC is at least
DCCG = O(v0b
−1
0 ), (12)
which is as good as Equation (11).
• Average path length: The given target graph requires that
any path across two groups consists of two types of
connections: normal node with central node, and central
node to central node. So we consider them separately.
For classical KPS, within a group or among central nodes,
the average path length is less or equal to
APL = DCC + 2(1−DCC) = 2−DCC. (13)
For graph-based KPS, connections within any group form
a SRG, so the average path length is
APLG = DCCG + 2(1−DCCG) ≈ APL. (14)
• Network resiliency: We assume that the captured nodes
are uniformly distributed among all the nodes. For clas-
sical KPS, each key occurs in r blocks (from the total
number of b blocks), and thus the probability that a key
is not compromised when x nodes are captured is
NRx =
(
b−r
x
)(
b
x
) = (b−O(b 12 )x )(
b
x
) , (15)
where we have applied r = v−1k−1 = O(vk
−1) = O(b
1
2 ).
This is also the probability that a given link is not
compromised.
For graph-based KPS, each key occurs in r0 = O(b
1
2
0 )
blocks (from the total number of b blocks), and thus the
probability that a key is not compromised when x nodes
are captured is
(
b−r0
x
)
/
(
b
x
)
. Further, the probability that
a given link within any group is not compromised is
NRGx =
(
b−r0
x
)(
b
x
) = (b−s− 12O(b 12 )x )(
b
x
) ; (16)
The resiliency for the central nodes ≥ NRGx, because
sτ0 ≤ b0. As a result, the resiliency in Equation (16) is
greater than that in (15).
• Storage overhead: For classical KPS, storage overhead is
given by
SO = k = O(vb−
1
2 ) = s
1
2O(v0b
− 12
0 ). (17)
For graph-based KPS, this is equal to k0 = O(v0b
− 12
0 ) for
a normal node, and 2k0 for a central node, so in average:
SOG = O(v0b
− 12
0 ) = s
− 12SO. (18)
6In summary, under the same network scalability, the direct
connectivity coverage and average path length of graph-based
KPS are no worse than those of the classical ones, while
the network resiliency and storage overhead are comparatively
improved. Thus, the overall performance is improved.
V. THE GT = (GcT , G
u
T , ∅) SCENARIO
In this scenario, we want to have a KPS whose design graph
is exactly GcT . We first consider the case where G
c
T is (by co-
incidence) the design graph of certain g-design with g = 2 and
parameters (λ, k, r, v, b). We start with such simple and “ideal”
case for two main reasons: first, it provides a benchmark for a
more general-purposed approach to be introduced in the next
section; second, designs for more complex target graphs may
be derived based upon the ideal ones.
We immediately obtain a satisfying KPS by the natural
mapping between blocks of the g-design and key rings. We
refer to it as the “natural” method.
The storage overhead is k. The scalability is v. As for
the network resiliency, if one node (block) is captured, there
will be
(
λ
2
)(
k
2
)
connections compromised. To observe this, we
first notice that any pair of points in the block appear in λ
blocks, and there are
(
k
2
)
such pairs, so
(
λ
2
)(
k
2
)
connections
are compromised. Moreover, any other connection is secure,
since the corresponding two blocks share at least one key that
is not captured.
Example 1. Let GcT be the graph shown in Figure 2(a). As
we can see, the nodes of GcT could be grouped into seven
disconnected pairs with all other edges connected in the graph.
For clarity, the complement of GcT is given in Figure 2(b).
Assume we would like to construct a KPS whose design graph
is GcT .
(a) (b)
Fig. 2: Graph GcT and its complement
We construct the following g-design with g = 2 and
parameters (λ, k, r, v, b) = (3, 4, 7, 8, 14):
V ={a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8}, (19)
B ={{a1a2a3a4}, {a1a2a5a6}, {a1a2a7a8}, {a1a2a6a8},
{a1a2a5a7}, {a1a4a5a8}, {a1a4a6a7},
{a5a6a7a8}, {a3a4a7a8}, {a3a4a5a6}, {a2a4a5a7},
{a2a4a6a8}, {a2a3a6a7}, {a2a3a5a8}}. (20)
Obviously (V,B) forms a g-design (g = 2) whose design
graph is GcT . In other words, we have obtained a satisfying
KPS with ai, i = 1, · · · , 8, representing the keys.
TABLE I: Matching and Reducing Algorithm
Input: GcT = [V (G
c
T ), E(G
c
T )], positive integer c0.
Let b = |V (GT )|, e = |E(GT )|.
Initialization:
l = 0, Gl = GcT .
Generate e different keys K = {k1, · · · , ke}.
Assign K to E(G0), s.t. each edge is assigned a unique key.
Define B = {B1, · · · , Bb}, where
Bn = {kt | kt is assigned to an edge which is incident to node n}.
Repeat (Clique reduction procedure)
l = l + 1;
Find a clique Cl in Gl−1 whose size is no larger than c0;
Denote KGl−1 as the set of keys assigned to E(C
l);
Update the blocks:
Bm = Bm −KGl−1 , ∀m ∈ V (Cl);
Arbitrarily choose a key kl from KGl−1 :
Bm = Bm ∪ {kl}, ∀m ∈ V (Cl);
Update from Gl−1 to Gl:
E(Gl) = E(Gl−1)− E(Cl);
Until no clique of size greater than 2 can be found.
Output: B, V = ∪bm=1Bm.
Next we evaluate the performance of this construction
by computing resiliency, storage overhead, and scalability
measures.
We consider the simple case when one node is captured,
say V1 = {a1a2a3a4}. In this case, there are 18 connections
compromised. To observe this, we first notice that any two
points of V1 appear in exactly 3 blocks; thus, there are(
3
2
)(
4
2
)
= 18 compromised connections in total. Besides this, if
both points of the intersection of two blocks do not belong to
V1, the two blocks are able to communicate in a secure way.
The storage overhead is the size of each block, i.e. k = 4.
The network scalability is the total number of points, i.e. v =
8.
Now the question is: for any given target graph GT =
(GcT , G
u
T , ∅), does there exist a KPS whose design graph GD
is exactly GcT ? In fact, we have a positive answer that is
guaranteed by the following algorithm.
VI. MATCHING AND REDUCING ALGORITHM (MAR)
A schematic diagram of the Matching and Reducing Algo-
rithm (MAR) is depicted in Table I.
In the initialization step, a unique key is assigned to each
edge, i.e. two nodes of that edge contain the key. Thus,
the key ring of each node has been determined. However,
we are motived to reduce the size of the key pool and key
rings. Notice that for any clique C in GcT , it will not change
the design graph if the distinct keys assigned to E(C) are
replaced by only one key; in other words, if all the nodes of
C share a common key, they still directly connect with one
another, and edges outside C are not affected. Therefore, MAR
looks for cliques in the current target graph, and reduces the
number of keys within each clique to one, and then updates
the target graph by removing the clique. The size of the clique,
however, is upper-bounded by a constant integer c0 to ensure
7a reasonable network resiliency. Consider, for example, if GcT
is a complete graph, one key is enough for full connectivity;
however, the the whole network is compromised as long as
any one node is captured.
Fig. 3: An illustrating example where MAR with c0 = 3 is
applied to a simple graph
An illustrating example is given in Figure 3.
We elaborate on the other aspects of this algorithm:
1) We did not give the details of how to detect cliques,
or the optimality criteria for clique selection. Indeed,
MAR encompasses many more algorithms. For example,
one may propose a specific algorithm that deviates from
MAR, in order to minimize the total number of keys
(min |V |), etc.
2) It is interesting that MAR is applied as a technical tool
to the proof of Theorem 2 (in Appendix B).
3) The upper bound of the clique size in MAR is designed
to ensure network resiliency NRx. But is there any
theoretical lower bound of NRx if the clique size is
bounded by c0? The following theorem gives a positive
answer.
A. Network Resiliency for MAR
Theorem 3. For a given graph GcT , assume that the degree of
any node is no larger than d, the network resiliency NRx of
the KPS determined by the Matching and Reducing Algorithm
satisfies
NRx ≥ 1−
x
(
c0
2
)d dc0−1e
|E(GcT )|
, (21)
where d dc0−1e denotes the smallest integer that is no less than
d
c0−1 .
Proof. Let us consider an arbitrary node x. Each key that
is assigned to x is associated with one clique in GcT , due
to the clique reduction procedure of the MAR algorithm (an
edge can be regarded as a clique of size 2). Assume that x
is associated with M cliques, and that clique m is of size
λm,m = 1, · · · ,M . Let ym = λm − 1. It is clear that
M∑
m=1
ym ≤ d, 1 ≤ ym ≤ c0−1. (c0 is given in the algorithm)
(22)
Moreover, the number of compromised links when node x is
captured is:
F (y1, · · · , ym) =
M∑
m=1
(
ym + 1
2
)
.
We now evaluate the maximum for F under constraint (22).
Let f(y) =
(
y+1
2
)
. Given positive numbers a, b, s in such
a way that s − a > 0, s − b > 0, it is easy to observe that
f(a)+f(s−a) < f(b)+f(s−b) if and only if |a− s2 | < |b− s2 |.
Given two positive variables y1 and y2 satisfying y1+y2 ≤
c0 − 1, we have
|y1 − y1 + y2
2
| < |(y1 + y2)− y1 + y2
2
|.
We conclude that
F (y1, y2, · · · , ym) < F (y1 + y2, · · · , ym). (23)
Moreover, given two positive variables y1 and y2 satisfying
y1 + y2 > c0 − 1, y1 ≤ y2 < c0 − 1, we have
|y2 − y1 + y2
2
| < |c0 − 1− y1 + y2
2
|.
We conclude that
F (y1, y2, · · · , ym) < F (c0 − 1, y1 + y2 − (c0 − 1), · · · , ym).
(24)
By continuous application of Inequalities (23) and (24), F
is maximized when
y1 = · · · = yM−1 = c0 − 1, yM = d− (M − 1)(c0 − 1),
M =
⌈
d
c0 − 1
⌉
.
Thus,
F (·) ≤
(
c0
2
)
M =
(
c0
2
)⌈
d
c0 − 1
⌉
= F0. (25)
If x nodes are captured, the worst case is that they do
not share keys and xF0 connections are compromised, which
implies the result in (21).
B. Example
In this section, we revisit the special case discussed in
Section V, i.e. GcT in GT = (G
c
T , G
u
T , ∅) is the design graph
of a g-design with g = 2 and parameters (λ, k, r, v, b). Now
we apply the Matching and Reducing Algorithm and choose
the parameter c0 to be λ, so that the network resiliency is not
worse than the “natural” method. Here are the reasons:
• Due to Theorem 1, the edge set of GcT is a disjoint union
of
(
v
2
)
subsets, each of which forms a clique of size λ.
Further, when MAR with c0 = λ is applied, it is clear
that the minimal number of keys is achieved when the
Cl in each step is one of the
(
v
2
)
cliques.
8• Therefore, there are
(
v
2
)
keys in total, and the number of
keys required by each node is
d
λ− 1 =
2|E(GcT )|
b
1
λ− 1 =
2
(
v
2
)(
λ
2
)
b
1
λ− 1 =
(
k
2
)
,
where the last equality is due to Equation (2).
• If one node is captured, there will be
(
k
2
)(
λ
2
)
connections
compromised, which is the same as the “natural” method.
• Finally, if c0 is chosen to be larger, the network resiliency
obviously decreases.
Returning to Example 1, the parameter c0 is chosen to be
3. There are
(
v
2
)
= 28 keys in total, and each node requires(
k
2
)
= 6 keys. The keys/key rings can be realized as:
B ={{12, 13, 14, 23, 24, 34}, {12, 15, 16, 25, 26, 56},
{12, 17, 18, 27, 28, 78}, {13, 16, 18, 36, 38, 68},
{13, 15, 17, 35, 37, 57}, {14, 15, 18, 45, 48, 58},
{14, 16, 17, 46, 47, 67}, {56, 57, 58, 67, 68, 78},
{34, 37, 38, 47, 48, 78}, {34, 35, 36, 45, 46, 56},
{24, 25, 27, 45, 47, 57}, {24, 26, 28, 46, 48, 68},
{23, 26, 27, 36, 37, 67}, {23, 25, 28, 35, 38, 58}}.
Here, each key is uniquely denoted by a two-digit integer. For
example, 12 represents a key, and 13 represents another key.
Clearly, if one node is captured, 6 · (c02 ) = 18 connections
are compromised, which is the same as the “natural” approach.
Moreover, if c0 is chosen to be 2, the network resiliency is
improved. This is because every connection is secured by a
unique key, and if one node is captured, only d = 12 < 18
connections are compromised. However, the storage overhead
increases and network scalability decreases.
If c0 is chosen to be 4, the network resiliency decreases. To
observe this, consider the following case:
Label the the 14 nodes to be n1, · · · , n14, and let two nodes
ni, nj be disconnected if and only if |i− j| = 7 (Figure 2). If
we apply MAR with c0 = 4, then it can be assumed that the
following four cliques of size 4 appear in the “clique reduction
procedure” (by possible relabeling):
{n1, n2, n3, n4}, {n1, n5, n6, n7},
{n1, n9, n10, n11}, {n1, n12, n13, n14}.
This means that if node n1 is captured, the four keys, along
with the 4 · (42) = 24 > 18 connections among the above four
cliques, are compromised.
In summary, the Matching and Reducing Algorithm pro-
vides a general solution for KPS design given an arbitrary
target graph. Nevertheless, the previous example reveals that
for specific target graphs (GcT ), there is a potential advantage
of using g-designs (g > 1) based KPS in terms of storage over-
head and scalability. We believe that g-design is a promising
design tool for KPS and leave that for future work here.
VII. CONCLUSION
We proposed the concept of graph-based KPS and relevant
evaluation metrics, motivated by several practical observations.
We introduced the g-designs, studied some of their connections
with graph theory, and applied them to KPS constructions.
Two specific target graphs are considered. Especially, we
introduced an algorithm framework called the Matching and
Reducing Algorithm. Examples are provided to demonstrate
the performance of the proposed scheme.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Consider a g-design (V,B) with g = 2 and design graph G.
Equation (1) implies that G has b = λv(v−1)k(k−1) nodes. Because
two connected blocks share exactly g = 2 keys, all edges in
G are induced by a pair of keys in V . Besides this, any pair
of keys induces a clique of size λ in G. Two cliques do not
share an edge, otherwise there exists two blocks that share
at least three keys. Finally, every block intersect with other
k(k−1)
2 (λ − 1) blocks, because each block contains k(k−1)2
pairs and each pair belongs to λ−1 other blocks. This implies
that G is regular.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Sufficiency:
Assume that a (λ = 1, k, v)-BIBD exists. Let G be its design
graph. Any point in V induces r nodes that are connected to
one another, forming a clique of size r. Besides this, any two
cliques induced by two different points do not share an edge,
because otherwise these two points appear in two different
blocks contradicting λ = 1. Finally, every block intersects with
other (r − 1)k blocks, because each block contains k points
and each point belongs to r−1 other blocks. This implies that
G is regular.
Necessity:
Let
k =
rv
b
=
v − 1
r
+ 1.
Applying MAR to the given graph G for v iterations, we obtain
(V,B) together with an empty graph Gl. Due to MAR, |V | =
v, each key appears in r blocks, and each block in B contains
d
r − 1 =
2e
b
1
r − 1 = 2
vr(r − 1)
2
1
b(r − 1) = k
keys. Next we prove that any pair of keys appear in exactly
one block. To this end, we let bij be the number of blocks
which keys i and j both belong to, and count the value of
B =
∑
1≤i,j≤v bij in two different ways: on one hand, because
each block contains k points and there are b blocks, B can be
calculated as
B =
k(k − 1)
2
b =
k(k − 1)
2
v(v − 1)
k(k − 1) =
v(v − 1)
2
.
On the other hand, any pair of keys appear in no more than
one block, because G is decomposed into v cliques any two of
which share no edges. Moreover, B is no more than the total
number of pairs v(v− 1)/2. Therefore, any pair must exactly
appear in one block.
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